The Transformation of British and American Naval Policy in the Pre-Dreadnought Era by Robert E. Mullins & John Beeler

Author:Robert E. Mullins & John Beeler
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Springer International Publishing, Cham

The evidence suggests that the Admiralty’s and government’s opposition to the professionals’ demands was beginning to crumble by the time the City National Defence Meeting took place. On May 23, the Civil Lord of the Admiralty, Conservative MP Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, allowed at a meeting of the Conservative Party-affiliated Primrose League (with Beresford in the audience) that he “would not grudge any expenditure necessary to put the Navy or Army upon a strong or equal footing.” 133 Ashmead-Bartlett even went so far as to acknowledge that “it would require millions and millions alone to complete this work.” Within two weeks of this admission, Salisbury set in motion a series of events that led to the drafting, debate, and passage of the Naval Defence Act.

This outcome, however, is scarcely imaginable without the five months of letters, lectures, meetings, and speeches, to say nothing of press support, initiated by Beresford and taken up by similarly minded officers to rally the public on naval policy. 134 While the Prime Minister privately deprecated the opinions of “service experts,” as a politician he was sensitive to the slightest change in the political atmosphere and quickly acquiesced to demands for a review of naval policy when circumstances convinced him of the political expediency of so doing. That the atmosphere was transformed to such an extent was the achievement of the 1888 public campaign, the principal spokesmen of which sought to incorporate into Admiralty policymaking strategic principles grounded in the navy’s history, principles enunciated by Laughton, Hall, and Philip Colomb, and endorsed by naval officers like Fitzgerald and Hornby. The aim of the campaign was achieved on July 1, 1888, when Arthur Hood unveiled an unprecedented shipbuilding proposal that not only reflected the strategic ideas articulated by Hall’s NID: it was closely modeled on the force planning memorandum that he had submitted unsolicited the previous November. The public campaign had achieved through external pressure what the Board and the government had hitherto resisted: greater professional input in the formulation of naval policy. Both were forced to confront and act upon proposals that they had earlier ignored.

The articulation of Admiralty strategic policy in July 1888 was the final act needed to initiate a new era in British naval policy formulation, where professional opinion received priority over financial considerations. 135 Hood had been requested by the Cabinet to “state the amount of force which he would require under certain eventualities.” 136 More specifically, the First Naval Lord was asked to answer three questions drafted with Salisbury’s input:What is the amount of naval force necessary in a naval war between this country without allies, and France under similar conditions, in order to protect the coasts of the United Kingdom against invasion or bombardment, and to protect the fortresses of Gibraltar and Malta, if attacked by the enemy’s fleet?

What force is required to afford (1) reasonable protection to trade routes, and (2) relief to coaling stations if attacked by a fleet?

What is the amount of naval force necessary in a naval war

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.